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CHALLENGES OF REGULATING A RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 
FACEBOOK
by
ANDRA GIURGIU*
This paper seeks to analyse the right to be forgotten that has been officially intro-
duced by the European Commission on the 25th of January 2012. By discussing the  
origins and legal grounds of this right, the article will argue that the right to be for -
gotten is merely a re-branding of long-standing data protection principles. Further-
more it will present the different views according to which the right to be forgotten  
means the deletion of data in due time or the right to a clean slate, before pointing  
out to the implications it may have on social networking sites like Facebook. Here it  
will  draw attention  to Facebook’s  noncompliance  with the  purpose  specification  
principle as well as to the legal uncertainties in identifying the controller on Face-
book. Finally the paper will look at the problems regarding the practicability of the  
right to be forgotten, supporting the opinion that enforceability can only be assured  
through the combination of legal and technical measures, before concluding to the  
questionability of its successful enforcement due to the European-American clash  
with regard to privacy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In an era in which storing digital  information has become much cheaper 
than deleting it, whilst personal data is regarded as being the new currency 
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on the Internet1, there is no wonder that people grow more and more con-
cerned when it comes to protecting their privacy. 
From the “right to be let alone”, as it was initially brought forward by 
the famous American lawyers Warren and Brandais2, the concept of privacy 
developed to the extent that it  included the individual’s  right to self-de-
termination3, understood as a right to construct, control and organize one’s 
private life according to one’s own wishes and conceptions.
In a digitalized world however, where we buy our clothes and pay our 
bills over the Internet, relying on it for the satisfaction of our daily needs, 
our secret wishes or simply for keeping up the illusion of not being alone 
through online chats with friends, acquaintances or even with strangers, the 
amount of information we put out there about ourselves is enormous. The 
digital reflection of our personality, the digital traces we are leaving every 
day have grown to become a threat to our future development.
A worrying evolution of social relations with regard to people’s right to 
privacy  and data  protection  is  social  networking.  There  is  nothing  new 
about your future employer looking you up on the Internet and stumbling 
upon photos of you on Facebook in which you act anything but professional 
and thus refusing you the chance of a job you have so eagerly wanted. This 
is one of the most feared scenarios among individuals and it is anything but 
unreasonable as the Drunken Pirate case4 demonstrates.
The main problem relies in the fact that the rapidly changing societal 
model has not allowed for legal norms to catch up, just yet. The Data Pro-
tection Directive5 was adopted at times when technology was less evolved 
and the flow of personal information significantly lower. Nowadays, wide-
spread data storage and data mining pose serious threats to the individual’s 
1 Ausloos, J. 2012, The „Right to be Forgotten – Worth Remembering?“, Computer Law and Se-
curity Review, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 143-152.
2 Warren, S. D., Brandeis, L. D. 1890, “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review vol. 4, no. 5, 
pp. 193-220.
3 Hornung, G., Schnabel, C. 2009, „Data protection in Germany I: The population census de-
cision and the right to informational self-determination“, Computer Law and Security Review, 
vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 84-88.
4 This is the case of Stacy Snyder, an aspiring teacher who was denied her teaching certificate 
because of an online photo that showed her in costume wearing a pirate’s hat and drinking  
from a plastic cup. The university administration considered it to be improper and unpro-
fessional behaviour for a teacher thus refusing her the teaching certificate. Removing the 
photo was no option to repare the damage as it has been catalogued by search engines and 
achieved by web crawlers. This case is very well described by Mayer-Schönberger, V. 2009, 
Delete. The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton and Oxford, pp. 1-2.
5 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (Data Protection Directive), O.J. L 281, 23.11.1995, pp. 0031-0050.
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rights to privacy and data protection and the directive seems especially out-
dated when it comes to protecting these rights in the online environment.
European regulators have long understood the need for adaptation and 
there have been many discussions around a new European framework for 
protecting people’s privacy. These have resulted in the Commission’s Pro-
posal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to  the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, also 
known  as  General  Data  Protection  Regulation6,  which  was  officially  re-
leased on the 25th of January 2012. Among other novelties the proposed reg-
ulation intends to strengthen individuals’ rights by introducing a so-called 
“right to be forgotten”7. According to Viviane Reding the right to be forgot-
ten is intended to cope with privacy risks online by empowering individu-
als to control their own identity in the online environment. Thus, “If an in-
dividual no longer wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a 
data controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data 
should be removed from their system”8. Although welcomed, regulating a 
right to be forgotten is easier said than done.
In the following the article will present an overview of this right, with re-
gard to its origins, its legal grounds and the different conceptions about it,  
before proceeding to a further analysis of the meaning and impact of the 
right to be forgotten with regard to social  networks,  more specifically to 
Facebook.
2. DANGERS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
As Victor Mayer-Schönberger eloquently points out, in the digital age the 
balance has shifted from forgetting as a norm to the default of remembering 
due to cheap storage,  easy retrieval  and the global  reach of information 
through global digital networks; in other words, “Today, forgetting has be-
come costly and difficult, while remembering is inexpensive and easy”9.
6 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25.01.2012, 
viewed  14.07.2012,  <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:00 
11:FIN:EN:PDF>.
7 Art. 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
8 Speech Reding, V., The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Set-
ter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital  Age,  Innovation Conference Digital, 
Life, Design, Munich, 22 January 2012.
9 Mayer-Schönberger, V. 2009, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age, Princeton and 
Oxford, pp. 62-92.
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This social phenomenon has resulted in the accumulation of more and 
more personal data risking to be misused. Digitalization is said to have a 
“chilling  effect”  (Mayer-Schönberger,  2009,  p.  12)  on  the  individual’s 
present actions.  His  freedom of expression and the right to self-develop-
ment are threatened by constant auto-censorship for fear of future negative 
consequences.
Another major risk recognized in the build-up of personal data is that of 
de-contextualization of information. Mayer-Schönberger (2009, p. 89) speaks 
of the dangers of de- and re-contextualization of digital information escap-
ing the control of the original creator when describing the phenomenon of 
rearrangement and redistribution of Michael Wesch’s video  Web 2.0. The 
term is also used by Dumortier with regard to Facebook “to conceptualize 
what happens when behaviours or information are used in a context other 
than that for which they were intended.”10 This represents a major risk on a 
social  networking  site  (SNS)  like  Facebook  that  requires  individuals  to 
provide real name and information when registering.  According to Face-
book’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’, Section 4 Registration and 
Account Security, “Facebook users provide their real names and informa-
tion”11.  A recent  practice  of  the  social  networking  site  was  asking  other 
users whether their friends use the account under their real names or not12.
The interdiction of using pseudonyms as well as the verification of the 
real identities of users by asking friends to confirm it seems especially ques-
tionable with regard to people’s right to privacy and personal data protec-
tion. According to Article 29 WP13 “SNS should consider carefully if they 
can justify forcing their users to act under their real identity rather than un-
der  a  pseudonym.  There  are  strong  arguments  in  favor  of  giving  users 
choice in this respect and in at least one Member State, this is a legal re-
quirement. The arguments are particularly strong in the case of SNS with 
wide membership.” This is especially the case of Facebook with millions of 
members worldwide.
10 Dumortier,  F.  2010,  “Facebook  and  Risks  of  “De-contextualization”  of  Information”,  in 
Gutwirth, S., Poullet, Y. & De Hert, P, Data Protection in a Profiled World, Springer, pp. 119-
137.
11 http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms, viewed 17.07.2012.
12 Smith, H. 2011, Facebook 'to ask users to identify friends as security measure', viewed 22.07.2012, 
<http://www.metro.co.uk/tech/853846-facebook-to-ask-users-to-identify-friends-as-security-
measure>.
13 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, WP 
163,  12.06.2009,  viewed  23.07.2012,  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wp-
docs/2009/wp163_en.pdf>.
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The site connects the “virtual bodies” of their members with their “real-
world” correspondents using “real world identification signs” such as pic-
tures,  videos,  and other such communication forms (Dumortier,  2009) so 
that for the avarage Facebook member who uses the site more than once 
every day this means leaving an endlessly long digital trail. Deleting this 
trail, or even just parts and bits of it, becomes therefore extremely difficult.
3. ORIGINS AND LEGAL GROUND OF THE RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN
3.1 ORIGINS
As regards the origins of the right to be forgotten, the dominant opinion is  
that advocating for its development from the right to privacy14. The right to 
be forgotten is said to rely on the collection limitation principle, the purpose 
specification principle and the use limitation principle as set down in the 
Data Protection Directive.
There are however voices linking it not to the right to privacy but to the 
right to identity15. Andrade (2012) is sharing Gutwirth’s view that “it is very 
doubtful that such a ‘right to be forgotten’ could be construed as a spin off 
of the right to privacy, since most of the time conflicts concern public facts 
(for instance, persons involved as victims or as witnesses of a crime) that are 
not protected by privacy rights”16.
There is also the proprietary approach to privacy17 according to which 
one is  the owner of his personal data thus having a certain control right 
over it. The right to be forgotten is said to be taking this approach as it al-
lows individuals to decide what happens with the information and to main-
tain control after disclosure (Ausloos, 2012).  The proprietary approach is 
therefore considered to be more effective as it gives individuals affirmative 
rights without the need to demonstrate harm. Moreover the “erga omnes” 
14 Bernal, 2011, Wong, 2008, Dumortier 2009, Rosen, 2012, Castellano 2012, Weber, 2011 etc.
15 Andrade, N. N. G. 2012, “Oblivion: The Right to be Different from Oneself – Reproposing 
the Right to be Forgotten, VII International  Conference  on  Internet,  Law  &  Politics.  Net 
Neutrality and other challenges for the future of the Internet, Revista de Internet, Derecho y 
Política, no. 13, pp. 122-137, viewed 05.07.2012, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2033155>.
16 Gutwirth, S. 2009, “Beyond identity?”,  Identity in the Information Society, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 
122-133.
17 Purtova, N. 2010, “Property in personal data: Second life of an old idea in the age of cloud 
computing, chain informatisation, and ambient intelligence”, in Gutwirth, S., Poullet, Y., De 
Hert,  P.  & Leenes,  R.  (eds.),  Computers,  Privacy and Data Protection:  an Element  of  Choice, 
Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York, pp. 39-64.
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effect  containing  a  general  obligation  of  refraining  from any action  that 
could impede on the subject’s right to property over his data would be bet-
ter suited for the enforcement of the right to be forgotten18.
3.2 LEGAL GROUNDS
The right to be forgotten is said to be a new right that was introduced for 
the first  time by the proposed Data Protection Regulation. This paper ar-
gues however in favour of the fact that  it  is  a  mere re-branding of long 
standing data protection rules. To support this argument we would like to 
point out to the Data Protection Directive which, under the title “Right of 
access”19, grants data subjects’ the right of rectification, erasure or blocking. 
The Directive refers to processing operations, which do not comply with its 
provisions, “in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of 
the data”. The lack of compliance can also result from violations of the gen-
eral rules on the lawfulness of the processing, including the infringement of 
the principles relating to data quality as stated in article 6 of the Directive,  
of the criteria for legitimate data processing listed in article 7 as well as of 
the conditions for processing special categories of data.
The proposed regulation for data protection refers in  article  17 to the 
right  to  be  forgotten and the  right  to  erasure.  The text  of  the  provision 
speaks however only of the right to erasure, which is granted to data sub-
jects in four cases:
a. When the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed;
b. When the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is 
based or when the storage period consented to has expired, and  
where there is no legal ground for the processing of the data;
c. When the data subject objects to the processing; and
d. When the processing does not comply with the Regulation for other 
reasons.
By comparing these provisions to the ones from the current Data Protec-
tion Directive one may find the sole reaffirmation of long standing data pro-
tection principles such as the purpose limitation principle, the principle of 
18 Koops,  B.-J.  2011,  „Forgetting  Footprints,  Shunning  Shadows.  A  critical  analysis  of  the 
„Right to be Forgotten“ in Big Data Practice“, SCRIPTed, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 229-256, viewed 
05.07.2012, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986719>.
19 Article 12 (b) of the Data Protection Directive.
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lawful processing based on the subject’s consent and his right to object. So 
far, apparently nothing new.
The Regulation introduces however a provision that obliges the control-
ler, if he has made the above mentioned data public, “to take all reasonable 
steps, including technical measures, in relation to data for the publication of 
which the controller is responsible, to inform third parties which are pro-
cessing the data, that a data subject requests them to erase any links to, or 
copy or replication of that personal data”20. This is actually the key provi-
sion when relating to the right to be forgotten. In its current form however 
an actual right to delete, respectively to be forgotten is not contained. For 
that  we have to look back at the draft  Regulation from November 2011. 
There it is stated that “Where the controller […] has made the data public, it 
shall in particular ensure the erasure of any public Internet link to, copy of,  
or replication of the personal data relating to the data subject contained in 
any publicly available communication service which allows or facilitates the 
search of or access to this personal data”21.
By comparing the two provisions it becomes clear that the officially re-
leased proposal contains merely an obligation to inform third parties about 
the request of erasure whereas it is the older version, which actually con-
tains a true right to be forgotten.
The infeasibility of an obligation on behalf of the controller to ensure the 
erasure of any public reference to the personal data must have struck the 
European legislator so that he has reviewed his position in the officially re-
leased document. This European Data Protection Supervisor, Peter Hustinx, 
also recognizes the more realistic nature of the obligation of endeavour con-
tained in article 17 rather than the initial obligation of result22.
4 WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN?
4.1 PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Although many references have been made to the right to be forgotten, it is 
still  unclear  what  it  means,  in  which  conditions  it  can  be  invoked and 
against  whom.  The doctrine  seems to distinguish  between two different 
conceptions regarding this right: the deletion of data in due time and the 
20 Article 17 General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
21 Article 15 parag. 2 General Data Protection Regulation COM(2011) Version 56.
22 Hustinx, P., European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the data protection reform 
package, Brussels, 7.03.2012.
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clean slate vision. The latter can be again subdivided in a perspective that 
outdated personal data should not be used against people and an individu-
al self-development perspective (Koops, 2011).
The right  to have data deleted in  due time might  mean according to 
Koops (2011) the deletion after use, when no longer relevant, when an ex-
piry date elapses or when the drawbacks of retention start outweighing the 
advantages. He too shares the opinion that in this form the right to be for-
gotten seems to already be part of the current data protection framework, 
by granting subjects the right to have personal data deleted when they are 
no longer relevant, accurate, or following a justified objection.
The perspective of a claim on a clean slate may be traced back to the 
French law’s “droit a l’oubli”, where it has the meaning of “the right to si-
lence on past events in life that are no longer occurring”23. It is based on the 
individual’s right to claim that outdated negative information is not used 
against him (Koops, 2011). In this manner it is usually linked to the interest 
of criminal offenders not to be confronted with negative information from 
the past. From this perspective, the right to be forgotten seems to function 
like a period of prescription. 
By citing Rouvroy, Koops (2011) refers to the self-development perspect-
ive of the right to be forgotten and describes it as “a right to speak and write 
freely, without fear of your person(ality) being fixed by what you express; it  
implies the sense of liberty of writing today and being able to change your 
mind  tomorrow”.  According  to  Koops  (2011)  the  right  to  be  forgotten 
would imply from this perspective “the sense of liberty of expressing your-
self freely in the here and now without fear that this might be used against 
you in the future.”
Also from the self-development perspective,  Andrade (2012) links the 
right to be forgotten not to the right to privacy but to the right to identity, 
when speaking of the right to oblivion as “the right to be different from oth-
ers, but also the right to be different from oneself, namely from one's past 
self.” Other authors also see the right to be forgotten from the clean slate 
perspective, from which it tries to ensure the privacy of individuals by al-
lowing them to escape the constant persecution of the past24.
23 Bernal, P.A. 2011, “A Right to Delete?”, European Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 2, no.2, 
viewed 24.07.2012, <http://ejlt.org//article/view/75/144>.
24 Castellano, P.S. 2012, „The right to be forgotten under European Law: a Constitutional de-
bate“,  Lex  Electronica,  vol.  16,  no.1,  viewed  03.07.2012,  <http://www.lex-
electronica.org/docs/articles_300.pdf>.
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4.2 DIFFERENT OFFICIAL VIEWS
There is  anything but a unitary vision regarding this right.  According to 
Viviane Reding herself this is not a new right but “builds on already exist -
ing rules  which  are  unfortunately not  clear,  nor  adapted to the Internet 
age”25. In her view the right to be forgotten seems to apply only to the on-
line environment in situations where people have given out that personal 
information themselves26.
The existence of the right to be forgotten in the actual data protection 
framework is also recognized by the European Digital Rights organization, 
EDRi. The organization expresses however its concerns about the fact that 
the right to be forgotten has not been respected. It considers that the proper 
analysis of the causes for the lack of compliance and the effective imple-
mentation of the principle of “privacy by design” are the key for future re-
spect of the right to be forgotten27.
The European Data protection Supervisor sees the right to be forgotten 
as a strengthened right of erasure which would allow for a better enforce-
ment in the digital environment but questions its effectivity and enforceabil-
ity28.
The Article  29 Working Party also welcomes the strengthening of the 
right to erasure but it too questions the effectiveness of the right to be for-
gotten in its current form29.
From the official standpoint the right to be forgotten is mainly seen as a 
strengthening of individuals’ rights in order to enable them to protect their 
privacy in the online environment better. In this context we feel that it is of  
particular interest to examine its impact on social networks. However, due 
25 Speech Reding,  V. 2012, The importance of strong data protection rules for  growth and 
competitiveness,  London,  1  March,  viewed  05.07.2012,  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/171&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN 
&guiLanguage=en>.
26 „If an individual wants to take its data off a service – the data the individual had put on the 
service – he should be capable of doing so. People will be able to erase the data they have 
given out if there are no legitimate grounds for retaining it.“ Speech Reding, V. 2012, The 
EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World, Brussels, 25 
January,  viewed  24.07.2012,  <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/ 
speeches/ data-protection -reform2012_en.pdf>.
27 EDRi response to EC consultation on the review of the Data Protection Directive, 15.01.2011,  
viewed 20.07.2012, <http://www.edri.org/files/20110115_EDRi_data_protection_final.pdf>.
28 Hustinx, P., European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the data protection reform 
package, Brussels, 7.03.2012.
29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform 
proposals, WP 191, 23.03.2012, viewed 04.07.2012, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protec-
tion/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp191_en.pdf>.
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to the variety of social networking sites (SNS) and their different ways of 
functioning, we would like to concentrate on Facebook as it is the one with 
the greatest social impact because of its widespread worldwide usage. Ac-
cording to a recent article, Facebook is supposed to have surpassed 900 mil-
lion active users in 201230.
5. THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FACEBOOK
5.1 FACEBOOK AND THE PURPOSE SPECIFICATION 
PRINCIPLE
One of the core principles of data protection is  that of lawful processing 
based on the consent of the data subject. This is the legal ground for collect-
ing and processing personal data by social networks, including Facebook. 
By signing up to Facebook the subject agrees to the terms and conditions of 
the company, including to its data use policy with regard to the processing 
of personal data.
However, according to the purpose specification principle personal data 
shall be collected for specified, lawful and/or legitimate reasons and not be 
subsequently processed in ways that are incompatible with those purposes. 
The main problem with Facebook as with other social networks is the fact 
that the purpose of the data collection and processing is either not clear, or 
too  broadly formulated31.  According to Facebook,  its  mission  is  “to give 
people the power to share and make the world more open and connected”32. 
But the purpose of connecting people is far too broad to correspond to the 
purpose specification principle.  According to the proposed regulation the 
data subject has the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of his per-
sonal data “when the data are no longer necessary in relation to the pur-
poses for which they were collected or otherwise processed”33.
Moreover Facebook’s data use policy states “We store data for as long as 
it is necessary to provide products and services to you and others, including 
those described above. Typically, information associated with your account 
will be kept until your account is deleted. For certain categories of data, we 
may also tell you about specific data retention practices”. 
30 Goldman,  D.  2012,  „Facebook  tops  900  million  users“,  viewed  27.07.2012, 
<http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/23/technology/facebook-q1/index.htm>.
31 Karg, M., Fahl, C, 2011, „Rechtsgrundlagen für den Datenschutz in sozialen Netzwerken“, 
Kommunikation und Recht, vol. 7-8, pp. 453-458.
32 http://www.facebook.com/facebook/info, viewed 27.07.2012.
33 Article 17 (a) General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
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Koops (2011) recognizes the danger of “Big Data” which “implies that 
data processing is based on vague purpose definition to allow unforeseen 
future  uses,  and  that  the  data  are  increasingly  used  for  secondary 
purposes”. In that he sees a challenge to the purpose limitation principle 
and to the effectiveness of the right to be forgotten. 
Having in mind the above mentioned about the neglection of the pur-
pose specification principle by Facebook, it  appears very unlikely for the 
right  to  be forgotten to be effectively  enforced on the grounds of article 
17(a) of the proposed regulation when the data is no longer necessary in re-
lation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed.
5.2 WHO IS DATA CONTROLLER ON FACEBOOK?
Another problem with Facebook is determining against whom the right to 
be forgotten is enforceable. In order to solve that problem one has to turn to 
the concept of “controller”. 
According to the regulation “controller means the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with 
others determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of 
personal data”.34
Analysing this concept in the cases of social network services, Article 29 
Working Party distinguishes between 3 types of controllers: the SNS pro-
viders, the application providers and the users. 
As data controller, Facebook provides the “means for the processing of 
user data” as well as the “basic services related to user management” and 
also determines “the use that may be made of user data for advertising and 
marketing purposes – including advertising provided by third parties”35.
When an individual posts a picture of himself on Facebook, the SNS has 
the role of a controller and the user is the data subject. The right to be for-
gotten by deletion of the photo is uncontroversial in this situation as Face-
book allows for the user himself to take down the post at any given time. A 
problem may arise however if the photo has in the meanwhile been copied 
or reposted by a “friend”. Koops (2011) clearly distinguishes between “di-
gital footprints”, as data created by users themselves, and “data shadows”,  
as data generated about users by others.
34 Art. 4(5) General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
35 Art. 29 WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking.
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In the case of “data shadows”, when the photo has been copied and re-
posted,  the user  has  the  first  option  of requesting  the  deletion from the 
friend himself,  who is  the primary data controller.  Should he refuse,  the 
user could turn to Facebook, who also takes the position of a data controller, 
and ask it to take down the photo. The question remains however if Face-
book is entitled to take down a photo against the consent of the person who 
posted it,  in this  case the friend who copied/reposted the deleted photo. 
Such a post could be protected by the right to freedom of expression, so that 
the data subject would have to prove an infringement to his right to privacy 
and there would be a need to strike a balance between the friend’s right to 
freedom of expression and the data subjects’ right to privacy. Even if the 
user’s takedown request is successful, the drawback of the right to be for-
gotten is that it has effect only for the future.
According to Art. 29 WP application providers may also act as control-
lers “if they develop applications which run in addition to the ones from the 
SNS and users decide to use that application”36.
A different  category of data controllers is  formed by the users them-
selves as indicated in the example above. Although in the majority of cases 
they act as data subjects, there are situations when they take the position of 
a data controller. It has been generally argued that individuals who process 
personal data of others on social networks act as data controllers. They are 
however usually covered by the “household exemption”, the processing be-
ing  considered  to be  taking  place  “in  the  cause  of  a  purely  personal  or 
household activity” of a natural person37. The scope of this exemption set 
down in the Data Protection Directive has been narrowed by the proposed 
regulation, which speaks of processing of personal data “by a natural per-
son without any gainful interest in the course of its own exclusively person-
al or household activity”38,  emphasizing the unprofitable character of the 
activity.
According to Article 29 Working Party (Opinion 5/2009) the exemption 
does however not apply if someone uses Facebook as a collaboration platt-
form for an association or a company and acts on their behalf or for the pur-
pose of advancing commercial, political or charitable goals. In these cases 
36 Art. 29 WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking.
37 Article 3  (1) Data Protection Directive.
38 Article 2 (2) (d) General Data Protection Regulation.
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the user is considered to act as a controller and therefore needs consent or 
some other legitimate grounds for the processing.
A high number of contacts would also make the household exemption 
non applicable39, access to profile information being a key element with re-
gard to the application of the household exemption. It is considered by the 
Article 29 WP (Opinion 5/2009) that “when access to a profile is provided to 
all members within a SNS or the data is indexable by search engines, access 
goes beyond the personal or household sphere” resulting in the application 
of the same legal regime as when any person uses technology platforms to 
publish personal data on the web. 
Even if the household exemption fails to apply, the user may still be pro-
tected by the exemption for journalistic purposes, artistic or literary expres-
sion and a balance has to be struck between the right to privacy and free-
dom of expression.
Other exceptions to the right to be forgotten and to erasure set down in  
the proposed regulation regard reasons of public interest in the area of pub-
lic health, historical, statistical and scientific purposes, legal data protection 
obligations and cases when the data processing is restricted40.
As the Article 29 WP has already stressed out (Opinion 5/2009 on online 
social networking) access and rectification rights, including the right to be 
forgotten, are not limited to the users of the SNS. Accordingly non-members 
must also have a means to exercise their right of access, correction and dele-
tion. 
There are many situations when Facebook users “tag” a non-member on 
a photo they post or link them to a specific location like a city, restaurant or 
bar using location services. One of the main problems is the fact that the 
person being tagged is not even aware of that action, thus not even realizing 
the disclosure of his/her personal data.
Moreover  through Facebook’s  “Like-button”  data  sets  can  be  created 
about people who are not members of Facebook based on their browsing 
behaviour. Even more worrying is the fact that the simple existence of the 
“Like-button” on a certain web page allows Facebook to place cookies and 
to track the web user, regardless of whether he actually uses the button or 
not, and that the database thus created can be later linked to the individual’-
39 Art. 29 WP Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking.
40 Art. 17 (3) General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
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s newly created Facebook profile,  should he decide to join the network41. 
The data collection through the “Like-button” takes place in the absence of 
any consent  from Facebook non-members and,  as Roosendaal  eloquently 
(2012) points out, one cannot assume that non-members have agreed to be-
ing subject of the collection by the mere use of the Internet. Moreover there 
is no specified purpose for the collection of the data. As a non-member of 
Facebook the data subject has no possibility to exercise his right to access 
and rectification and thus obtain the deletion of his personal data.
6. PRACTICALITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO 
BE FORGOTTEN
6.1 THE NEED FOR A TECHNICAL APPROACH
Even if one disregards the existing doctrinal controversies over the different 
approaches to  the right to be forgotten,  one directly stumbles  across  the 
problems regarding its enforceability. In order for it to be effective, there is 
need for a combination between legal and technical  regulatory measures 
(Koops, 2011). The legal provisions comprised in the proposed regulation 
have been already analysed above. But the right to be forgotten needs to be 
strengthened by appropriate technical measures. 
The Commission itself recognized the need to set out obligations for data 
controllers in form of technical and organizational measures in the design 
and operation of ICT according to the principles of privacy by design and 
privacy by default42.  Although having been around for about twenty-five 
years, PETs as means of enhancing privacy or control, have proved to be 
quite  unsuccessful  due to weak consumer demand, high implementation 
costs and the fact that online advertising enable firms to make huge profits 
based on the collection, analysis and sharing of consumer data43.
Mayer-Schönberger (2009, p. 171), sees a possible solution44 to the prob-
lem of digital remembering in the introduction of expiration dates, under 
41 Roseendaal, A. 2012, „We Are All Connected to Facebook...by Facebook!“, in Gutwirth, S.,  
Poullet, Y., De Hert, P. & Leenes, R. (eds.), European Data Protection: In Good Health?, Spring-
er, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York,  pp. 3-19.
42 Art. 23 General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
43 For the difference between PETs and privacy by design and their classification see Rubin-
stein, I. S., 2011, „Regulating Privacy by Design“, in Berkley Technology Law Journal, vol. 
26, no. 3, pp. 1409-1455.
44 Other solutions he discusses are digital abstinence, information privacy rights empowering 
people to maintain digital control, a digital privacy rights infrastructure based on the prin-
ciple of digital rights management, cognitive adjustment, information ecology and perfect 
contextualization. Mayer-Schönberger, 2009, pp. 128-168.
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the form of meta-information associated with a piece of information, which 
would be determined by the subjects and thus allow for automatic deletion 
of the information. In his book he even proposed the solution of negotiating 
expiration dates between transactional parties (2009, p. 185). 
Andrade (2012) has pointed out to already existing initiatives in this dir-
ection such as the software Vanish, that enabled users to control the “life-
time” of any kind of data stored in  the cloud,  including information  on 
Facebook45.  Another possible approach is  seen in the German start-up-X-
pire which developed software that enables users to attach expiry dates to 
digital content 46, including to images uploaded to Facebook.
Other possible ways of “being forgotten” by the Internet have been seen 
in newly developed services to bury information (Weber, 2011) so that the 
retrieval becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. This is considered to 
be an option to the actual deletion of the information. There are also com-
panies  specializing in  online  reputation management like  reputation.com 
whose task it is to make people and businesses look their best on the Inter-
net. 
Dumortier (2009) suggests increasing the responsibility of operators of 
SNS like Facebook by making them accountable for the design of the site. 
He proposes that European authorities demand Facebook to adapt the ar-
chitecture of the site according to the user’s interests in order to limit the 
data collection according to a more specific purpose and allow for the col-
lection of adequate, non-excessive and relevant data according to that pur-
pose. He too is an advocate of using pseudonyms.
6.2 EUROPEAN-AMERICAN GULF REGARDING PRIVACY
Even if the right to be forgotten would be properly defined, its scope clear, 
the conditions in which it could be asserted properly determined and its en-
forcement  unproblematic,  the  clash  between  the  American  and  the 
European conceptions of balance between privacy and free speech would 
still remain.
The fact that, as Werro (2009) put it, “the Europeans trust in the govern-
ment and distrust the market, while Americans take precisely the opposite 
45 Markhoff,  J.  2009,  „New  Technology  to  Make  Digital  Data  Self-Destruct“,  viewed 
23.07.2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/science/21crypto.html>.
46 http://www.backes-srt.de/produkte/x-pire/, viewed 20.07.2012.
376 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 7:2
view” resulted in different approaches to the right to privacy on the two 
continents.
Under U.S. law the utmost importance is granted to freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press, to the possible detriment of the individual’s right 
to  privacy.  According  to  the  First  Amendment  of  the  American  Bill  of 
Rights “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press […]”47 leaving the right to be forgotten unprotected in the 
United States48.
The European approach is different. The protection of the individual’s 
private and family  life  is  stated in  the European Convention on Human 
Rights  (Article  8)49 and  in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the 
European Union (Article 7)50. Moreover the Council’s Convention 10851  and 
the Data Protection Directive grant subjects the right to the protection of 
their personal data recognizing a right to erasure while the proposed Regu-
lation foresees a right to be forgotten.
The scope of the application of the European data protection rules has 
been extended to include controllers not established in the Union, as long as 
the data subject resides in the Union and the processing activities concern 
“the offering of goods and services to such data subjects” or “the monitor-
ing of their behaviour”52.
However the unilateral statement on behalf of the European legislator, 
that companies like Google and Facebook shall fall under European juris-
diction if their activities concern European citizens, is far from being an eas-
ily enforceable provision.
The case of Yahoo! v. LICRA is a very good example for a situation in 
which European jurisdiction is denied by American courts because of differ-
ent views.  In the case concerning the sale of memorabilia from the Nazi 
47 Bill  of  Rights  of  the  United  States  of  America  (1791),  viewed  14.07.2012,  <http://billo-
frightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/>.
48 Werro, F. 2009, “The Right to Inform v. The Right to be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash”, in 
Liability in the Third Millenium, Colombi Ciacchi, A.,  Godt, C., Rott,  P. & Smith, L.J. (eds.), 
Baden-Baden, F.R.G., Nomos, viewed 14.07.2012, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401357>.
49 European Convention on Human Rights, viewed 13.07.2012, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ 
CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf>.
50 Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  viewed  13.07.2012, 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf>.
51 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal  Data,  Strasbourg,  28.01.1981,  viewed  23.07.2012,  <http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm>.
52 Article 3(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation COM(2012) 11 final.
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period through Yahoo’s auction site to French citizens, the High Court of 
Paris concluded that Yahoo violated the French Criminal Code and sought a 
Motion to Dismiss. On the other side of the Atlantic however, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District  of California found the de-
cision of the French court to be inconsistent with the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution relating to freedom of expression and thus inapplic-
able in the U.S.53
Considering the clash of approaches between Europeans and Americans 
with regard to the right to privacy and the impossibility of an actual en-
forcement of European principles onto American companies, as illustrated 
in the Yahoo! v. LICRA case, it remains doubtful if the proposed right to be 
forgotten will actually have an impact on SNS like Facebook and be able to 
protect individual rights as it was intended to.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In today’s digital era our past has become ubiquitous. Every move we have 
made has been indexed, analysed, evaluated, resulting in a complex digital 
image which risks overgrowing who we are in the present. 
The need to counteract this development by explicitly regulating a right 
to be forgotten comes as no surprise. However, considering the Data Protec-
tion Directive’s provisions regarding the right of access,  in particular the 
right to request erasure, and the already existing collection limitation, pur-
pose specification, data quality and use limitation principles, advertising a 
supposedly newly introduced right is rather unsupported. The right to be 
forgotten appears as a way of strengthening already existing data principles 
and the right to erasure. The discussion should rather be focused on the 
reasons for the failure of the rights and principles contained in the Data Pro-
tection Directive.
Expressly addressing the need to forget  by the European legislator  is 
nevertheless welcomed. But it remains quite doubtful if the mentioned right 
will be successful in the context of its blurry regulation. Does it mean the 
deletion of data in due time or the right to a clean slate? Does the latter ap-
proach  suggest  that  outdated  personal  data  should  not  be  used  against 
53 For details see Mankowski, P., 2002, „U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia: Yahoo vs. LICRA“ Rechtsprechung, in MMR – MultiMedia und Recht, vol. 1, pp. 26-30 
and also Greenberg, M., H. 2003 „A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA V. Yahoo! Case And The 
Regulation Of Online Content In The World Market“, in Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 
vol. 18, pp. 1191-1258, viewed 14.07.2012, <http://www.btlj.org/data/articles/18_04_05.pdf>.
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people or rather a right to self-development? Neither official authorities nor 
legal doctrine have adopted a well-defined position regarding the concept 
of the right to be forgotten. Under these circumstances it is only natural for 
further enforcement issues to arise.
There is no greater need of protecting the individual’s privacy by allow-
ing him to be forgotten than within social networks. Facebook allows for the 
collection of huge amounts of personal data so that the subject needs legal 
aid in order to enforce his right to privacy and to be forgotten.
To support this argument one needs only consider Facebook’s lack of 
compliance  with  the  purpose  specification  principle,  which  increases  the 
risk of de-contextualization of information and may lead to what is called a 
“chilling effect” on the individual’s development.
Moreover the absence of a clear unitary approach regarding the concept 
of “controller”, against whom the right to be forgotten is to be asserted, and 
the resulting problems of liability and responsibility still have be tackled.
Only,  after  having solved these  conceptual  aspects,  one still  stumbles 
against enforcement problems. In order to be effective, the legal measures 
regarding the right to be forgotten have to be strengthened by appropriate 
technical measures.
The legal approach towards regulating privacy by design takes the right 
to be forgotten a step further, however only theoretical.  Theoretically we 
stumble on further unclarities regarding the implementation of this prin-
ciple. Options like introducing expiration dates for digital information, ser-
vices to “bury information”, online reputation management, making Face-
book responsible for the architecture of the SNS have been considered as 
possible solutions.
Presuming that all these hurdles have been overcome, the effectiveness 
of the right to be forgotten remains extremely questionable in the context of 
Europeans and Americans having different views on privacy and the im-
possibility of imposing European legal solutions on American courts54.
54 This  work was supported by the strategic  grant POSDRU/6/1.5/S/26,  co-financed by the 
European Social Fund, within the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources De-
velopment 2007 – 2013.
